




***Berlin Conference on the Human Dimensions of  
Global Environmental Change (by video), 23 February 2008***

## **Profitable, Business-Led Solutions to the Climate, Oil, and Nuclear Proliferation Problems**



*To be truly radical is to make hope possible, not despair convincing.*

— Raymond Williams

**Amory B. Lovins**

Chairman & Chief Scientist  
Rocky Mountain Institute  
[www.rmi.org](http://www.rmi.org)

MAP/Ming Prof. '07  
Stanford Eng. School  
[www.rmi.org/stanford](http://www.rmi.org/stanford)

Dir. & Chairman Emeritus  
**FIBERFORGE**  
[www.fiberforge.com](http://www.fiberforge.com)

[ablovins@rmi.org](mailto:ablovins@rmi.org)



## Energy policy: a multiple-choice test

---

Would you rather die of:

1. climate change?
2. oil wars?
3. nuclear holocaust?

The right answer, often left out, is:

4. none of the above

*Let's just use energy in a way that saves money,  
because that will solve the climate, oil, and pro-  
liferation problems—not at a cost but at a profit*



## What has reduced energy intensity already done? What more can it do?

- ◆ During 1975–2006, the U.S. made a dollar of real GDP with 48% less total energy, 54% less oil, 64% less directly used natural gas, 17% less electricity, and two-thirds less water
  - Despite stagnant light-vehicle efficiency for >20 years, and perverse incentives rewarding electricity sales in 48 states
  - Nobody noticed: we haven't paid attention since the mid-1980s
- ◆ Full use of today's best end-use efficiency techniques would deliver the same or better services but save:
  - half the oil, at a sixth of its price
  - half the natural gas, at an eighth of its price
  - three-fourths of the electricity, at an eighth of its price
- ◆ Investing to achieve those savings over several decades would cost 6× less than buying the energy, and would make energy prices lower and less volatile
- ◆ Proper pricing matters less than barrier-busting



**Q. How is climate protection like the Hubble Space Telescope?**

**A. Both were spoiled by a sign error ("+" vs. "-")**


**The incorrect *assumption* that climate protection will be costly is the biggest obstacle to climate protection**





# 2007 Vattenfall/McKinsey supply curve for abating global greenhouse gases (technologically very conservative, esp. for transport)

## Global cost curve of GHG abatement opportunities beyond business as usual





# Saving energy is cheaper than buying it, so firms are starting to buy energy efficiency whether or not they worry about climate

## ◆ IBM and STMicroelectronics

- CO<sub>2</sub> emissions -6%/y, fast paybacks



## ◆ DuPont's 2000–2010 worldwide goals

- Energy use/\$ -6%/y, add renewables, cut absolute greenhouse gas emissions by 65% below 1990 level
- By 2006: actually cut GHG 80% below 1990, \$3b profit



## ◆ Dow: cut E/lb 22% 1994–2005, \$3.3b profit

## ◆ BP's 2010 CO<sub>2</sub> goal met 8 y early, \$2b profit

## ◆ GE pledged 2005 to boost its eff. 30% by 2012

## ◆ Interface: 1994–2006 GHG -60% (-9.2%/y)

## ◆ TI new chip fab: -20% en., -35% water, -30% capex



◆ So while the politicians endlessly debate theoretical "costs," smart firms race to pocket real *profits*!




## Profitable climate protection

- ◇ Global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions will triple by 2100 if we reduce E/GDP by 1%/y; level off if 2%/y; and drop—stabilizing the Earth's climate—if  $\sim 3\%/y$ . Is that feasible?
- ◇ The U.S. has spontaneously saved  $>2\%/y$  since '97; 3.4%/y 1981–86; 3.2%/y in '01 & '05, 4.0% in '06
- ◇ California was  $\sim 1$  percentage point faster; its new homes use 75% less energy; still saving much more
- ◇ China did even better—saved  $>5\%/y$  for  $>20$  y, 7.9%/y 1997–2001; energy efficiency is top priority
- ◇ Attentive corporations routinely save  $\sim 6\text{--}9\%/y$
- ◇ Even Japan can profitably save 2/3 of *its* energy, so the US, with 2–3 $\times$  more E/GDP, has a long way to go
- ◇ Oil causes 42% of all CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, electricity 40%





# Surprisingly, the vision of contraction & convergence is both feasible & profitable





**Independent, transparent,  
peer-reviewed, uncontested,  
DoD-cosponsored, Sept 04**

**For business/mil. leaders**


**Based on competitive  
strategy cases for cars,  
trucks, planes, oil, military**

**Book and technical backup  
are free at:**

**[www.oilendgame.com](http://www.oilendgame.com)**

***Over the next few decades,  
the U.S. can eliminate its use  
of oil and revitalize its  
economy, led by business for  
profit***


***(So, probably, can Germany)***



This work was cosponsored by OSD and ONR. The views expressed are those of the authors alone, not of the sponsors.



# A profitable US transition beyond oil (with best 2004 technologies)







# Vehicles use 70% of US oil, but integrating low mass & drag with advanced propulsion saves $\sim 2/3$ very cheaply

CARS: save 69% at \$0.15/L


PLANES: save 20% free, 45–65% @  $\leq \$0.12/\text{L}$

Surprise: ultralighting is **free** — offset by simpler automaking and the 2–3 $\times$  smaller powertrain



250 km/h, 2.5 L/100 km

TRUCKS: save 25% free, 65% @ \$0.07/L



BLDGGS/IND: big, cheap savings; often *lower capex*



Technology is improving faster for efficient end-use than for energy supply




# Each day, your car uses $\sim 100\times$ its weight in ancient plants. Where does that fuel energy go?

13% tractive load



87% of the fuel energy is wasted



- 6% accelerates the car, 0.3% moves the driver
- Three-fourths of the fuel use is weight-related
- Each unit of energy saved at the wheels saves  $\sim 7-8$  units of gasoline in the tank (or  $\sim 3-4$  with a hybrid)
- **So first make the car radically lighter-weight!**





## Three technology paths: aluminum, light steels, carbon composites (the strongest & lightest)




- *SLR McLaren* suffers immaterial damage in side impact by *Golf*
- 7 kg of woven carbon crush cones (0.4% of car's mass) can absorb all frontal crash energy at 105 km/h with thermoset (better w/thermoplastic)



Graphics courtesy of  
DaimlerChrysler AG

- Carbon-composite crush structures can absorb 6–12× as much energy per kg as steel—and more smoothly
- Size is protective, weight hostile; so adding size without weight adds protection and comfort without aggressivity or fuel inefficiency ...saving both oil *and* lives (and \$)





## Ultralight safety confirmed by racecar crash experience (even with relatively brittle thermosets)



Katherine Legge's 290-km/h  
walk-away *ChampCar* wall crash  
on 29 September 2006

**Midsize Revolution midsize SUV, 5 adults in comfort, 2 m<sup>3</sup> cargo**  
**Ultralight (-53%, 857 kg) but ultrasafe**  
**0-100 km/h in 8.3 s (later 7.2)**  
**3.56 L/100 km w/gasoline hybrid**  
**2.06 "L"/100 km w/H<sub>2</sub> fuel cell**



**"We'll take two."**  
**— Automobile**  
**magazine**

**World Technology**  
**Award, 2003**

**Show car and a complete virtual design (2000),**  
**uncompromised, production-costed, manufactur-**  
**able; hybrid yields 1-y payback vs EU gasoline**







# Radically simplified manufacturing

## ◆ Mass customization

- *Revolution* designed for 50k/year production volume
- Integration, modular design, and low-cost assembly
- Low tooling and equipment cost



- 14 major structural parts, no hoists
- 14 low-pressure diesets (not  $\sim 10^3$ )
- Self-fixturing, detoleranced in 2 dim.
- No body shop, optional paint shop
- Plant 2/5 less capital/car-y, 2/3 smaller





*Selected examples*

## Carbon-fiber composites: some automotive uses today

- ◇ Ford: *GT*—adv. composites + light metals
  - The most technologically advanced vehicle made in a production envt. using advanced light materials
- ◇ BMW: 60 specialists at Landshut with world's biggest RTM press
- ◇ GM: *Corvette Z06* panels
- ◇ Tesla: *Roadster* full body
- ◇ Honda and Toyota: Carbon-fiber airplanes
- ◇ Fiberforge®: 1999 RMI spinoff (W. Colo.)
  - Thermoform to net shape,  $\leq 1$ -minute cycle time
  - Near aerospace performance, near automotive cost
  - Development customers include OEMs and Tier 1s, e.g., JCI *Genus* seat (NAIAS 05); first manufacturing machine (aerospace) shipped 2007







# Toyota's Hypercar<sup>®</sup>-class 1/X concept car (Tokyo Motor Show, 26 Oct 2007)




- ◇ 2× *Prius* efficiency, similar interior vol. (4 seats)
- ◇ 3× lighter (420 kg)
- ◇ carbon-fiber structure
- ◇ 0.5-L flex-fuel engine
- ◇ plug-in hybrid-electric
- ◇ powertrain under rear seat), rear-wheel drive

- One day before, Toray announced a ¥30b plant to mass-produce carbon-fiber autobody panels and other parts for Toyota *et al.*
- William Clay Ford Jr., 13 Nov 2007: "In the mid-term—between 2012 and 2020—weight reduction becomes a critical part of our strategy. One of the lessons we have learned is the synergistic benefits of weight reduction, which are even greater than we anticipated."




## Emerging powertrain breakthroughs too...



- ◇ Fast, small, light, cheap, proven, mature electronic valves permit extremely precise fuel and air injection under real-time closed-loop control
- ◇ This in turn permits unusual event sequences and combustion cycles in camless engines
- ◇ Those are expected to yield  $\sim 55\text{--}60\%$  efficiency from any fuel (on the fly), with  $>50\%$  higher torque,  $>30\%$  smaller size,  $>10\%$  lower cost, and extremely low emissions with no cleanup
- ◇ Demonstrated 1/07 ([www.sturmanindustries.com](http://www.sturmanindustries.com))
- ◇ Or inject a tiny squirt of ethanol into IC engine: 3 pressure, no knock;  $2\times$  smaller engine,  $1.25\text{--}1.3\times\eta$  (Sloan Automotive Lab, MIT)



## 2025 demand-supply integration



### Great flexibility of ways and timing to *eliminate* oil in next few decades

- Buy more efficiency (it's costing only half as much as the oil it replaces)
- Efficiency is only half captured by 2025 — 7 Mbbbl/d is still in process
- "Balance" can import crude oil/product (can be all N. Amer.) or biofuels
- Or saved U.S. natural gas @ \$0.9/GJ can fill the "balance"...or
- H<sub>2</sub> from saved U.S. natural gas can displace "balance" *plus* domestic oil
- Not counting other options, e.g., Dakotas windpower—huge H<sub>2</sub> resource




**857-kg curb mass ( $\div 2$ ), low drag, load  $\div 3$ ,  
so 89 km/h on same power as normal a/c,  
so ready now for direct hydrogen fuel cells**

137-liter 345-bar H<sub>2</sub> storage  
(small enough to package):  
3.4 kg for 530-km range

35-kW fuel cell (small  
enough to afford early:  
~32x less cumulative  
production needed to  
reach needed price)

35-kW  
load-leveling  
batteries






# Implementation is underway via "institutional acupuncture"

- ◇ RMI's 3-year, \$4-million effort is leading & consolidating shifts
- ◇ Need to shift strategy & investment in six sectors
  - Aviation: Boeing did it (*787 Dreamliner*)...and beat Airbus
  - Heavy trucks: Wal-Mart led it (with other buyers being added)
  - Military: emerging as the federal leader in getting U.S. off oil
  - Fuels: strong investor interest and industrial activity
  - Finance: rapidly growing interest/realignment will drive others
- ◇ Cars and light trucks: slowest, hardest, but now changing
  - Alan Mulally's move from Boeing to Ford with transformational intent
  - Workers and dealers not blocking but eager for fundamental innovation
  - Schumpeterian "creative destruction" is causing top executives to be far more open to previously unthinkable change
  - Emerging prospects of leapfrogs by China, India, ?new market entrants
  - RMI's two transformational projects and "feebate" promotion are helping
  - Competition, at a fundamental level and at a pace last seen in the 1920s, will change automakers' managers or their minds, whichever comes first






# The oil industry's conventional wisdom: approximate long-run supply curve for world crude oil and substitute fossil-fuel supplies



Source: BP data as graphed by USDoD JASON, "Reducing DoD Fossil-Fuel Dependence" (JSR-06-135, Nov. 2006, p. 6, [www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/fossil.pdf](http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/fossil.pdf)), plus (red crosshatched box) IEA's 2006 *World Energy Outlook* estimate of world demand and supply to 2030, plus (black/gray) RMI's coal-to-liquids (Fischer-Tropsch) estimate derived from 2006-07 industry data and subject to reasonable water constraints. This and following graphic were redrawn by Imran Sheikh (RMI)



# How that supply curve stretches ~3 Tbbbl if the U.S. potential shown in *Winning the Oil End-game* scales, very approximately, to the world




<sup>†</sup>These substitutions make sense at any relative prices. Depending on future prices, additional such substitutions several- to manyfold larger than shown are also available

<sup>\*</sup>Probably much understated because scaling from U.S. to world should count abundant tropical cane potential; also, the estimate does not include emerging major options like algal oils

To scale from U.S. alternatives-to-oil potential in Mbbbl/d achievable by the 2040s (at average cost \$16/bbl in 2004 \$: [www.oilendgame.com](http://www.oilendgame.com)) to world potential over 50 y, multiply the U.S. Mbbbl/d × 146,000: 365 d/y × 50 y × 4 (for U.S.→world market size) × 2 (for growth in services provided). Obviously actual resource dynamics are more complex and these multipliers are very rough, so **this result is only illustrative and indicative.**




## Stretching oil supply curve by ~3 Tbbl averts >1 trillion tonnes of carbon emissions and tens of trillions of dollars + OPEC rent



Nobody can know who's right about peak oil, but it doesn't matter



## 1989 supply curve for saveable US electricity (vs. 1986 frozen efficiency)



Best 1989 commerci-  
ally available, retrofit-  
table technologies

Similar S, DK, D, UK...

EPRI found 40–60%  
saving 2000 potential

Now conservative:  
savings keep getting  
bigger and cheaper  
faster than they're  
being depleted

*Measured technical cost and performance data for  
~1,000 technologies* (RMI 1986–92, 6 vol, 2,509 pp, 5,135 notes)





# -44 to +46 °C with no heating/cooling equipment, less construction cost



2200 m, frost any day, 39 days' continuous midwinter cloud...yet 28 banana crops with no furnace



Key: integrative design—multiple benefits from single expenditures

- ◇ Lovins house / RMI HQ, Snowmass, Colorado, '84
  - Saves 99% of space & water heating energy, 90% of home el. (372 m<sup>2</sup> use ~120 W<sub>av</sub> costing ~\$5/month @ \$0.07/kWh)
  - 10-month payback in 1983
- ◇ PG&E ACT<sup>2</sup>, Davis CA, '94
  - Mature-market cost -\$1,800
  - Present-valued maint. -\$1,600
  - 82% design saving from best 1992 std., ~90% from US norm
- ◇ Prof. Soontorn Boonyatikarn house, Bangkok, Thailand, '96
  - 84% less a/c capacity, ~90% less a/c energy, better comfort
  - No extra construction cost






# Passive comfort in cold, cloudy climates like Germany (Passivhaus Institut)

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Passive\\_house](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Passive_house), [www.passiv.de](http://www.passiv.de); Affordable Comfort Institute



- ◇ No central heating system; can add small exhaust-air heat pump or solar panel if desired, but not necessary
- ◇ Total primary energy use  $\leq 120 \text{ kWh/m}^2\text{-y}$
- ◇  $\leq 15 \text{ kWh/m}^2\text{-y}$  &  $< 10 \text{ W/m}^2$  heating energy—5–25% of U.S. allowables
- ◇  $k=0.10\text{--}0.15$  ( $k=0.066$  roof in Sweden), airtight, high comfort, loses  $< 0.5 \text{ }^\circ\text{C/d}$  w/ 0 el.
- ◇  $> 10\text{k}$  built in 5 EU nations; Vorarlberg (ÖS) standard
- ◇ *Zero marginal capital cost* (at least at  $< 60^\circ \text{N}$  lat)



Infrared images of ordinary German apartment (L) and Passivhaus (R)



# Houses comfortable with no heating system in Göteborg, same capital cost



- ◇ Hundreds of "Passivhus" examples around Göteborg, typically designed by architects Hans Eek or Christer & Kerstin Nordström

- ◇ No extra capital cost

## PASSIVE HOUSES AT LINDÅS

Selling price: ca 2 000 000 SEK


EXTRA COSTS:	SEK
Insulation:	15 – 20 000
Air-to-air heat exchangers	10 – 15 000
Windows U=0,85	15 – 20 000
<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>40 – 50 000</b>

**MINUS HEATING SYSTEM – 40 – 50 000**

- ◇ Cost-effectively retrofittable too



## Old design mentality: always diminishing returns...





# **New design mentality: expanding returns, “tunneling through the cost barrier”**

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






## New design mentality: expanding returns, “tunneling through the cost barrier”

“Tunnel” straight to the  
superefficient lower-cost  
destination rather than  
taking the long way  
around



To see how, please visit [www.rmi.org/stanford](http://www.rmi.org/stanford)




# New design mentality



- Pumps and fans use half of motor energy; motors use 3/5 world electricity
- Redesigning a standard (supposedly optimized) industrial pumping loop cut its power from 70.8 to 5.3 kW (–92%), cost less to build, and worked better
- Just by specifying fat, short, straight pipes—not (as usual) thin, long, crooked pipes!
- Even better design could have saved ~98% and cost even *less* to build
- This example is archetypical




## Compounding losses...or savings...so start saving at the *downstream* end to save ten times as much energy at the power plant



Also makes upstream equipment smaller, simpler, cheaper




## It's often remarkably simple



Boolean pipe  
layout

VS.



hydraulic pipe  
layout





# High-efficiency pumping / piping retrofit (Rumsey Engineers, Oakland Museum)



15 "negapumps"



Notice smooth piping design  
– 45°s and Ys

Downsized condenser-water pumps, ~75% energy saving





## Examples from RMI's industrial practice (>\$30b of facilities)

- ◇ Save half of motor-system electricity; retrofit payback typically <1 y
- ◇ Retrofit chip fabs, save 30–50+% of cooling/fan/pump power, 2-y paybk
- ◇ Retrofit very efficient oil refinery, save 42%, ~3-y payback
- ◇ Retrofit North Sea oil platform, save 50% el., get the rest from waste
- ◇ Retrofit USNavy *Aegis* cruiser's hotel loads, save ~50%, few-y paybacks
- ◇ Retrofit huge LNG plant, ≥40% energy savings; ~60%? new, cost less
- ◇ Redesign \$5b gas-to-liquids plant, –\$1b capex, save >50% energy
- ◇ Redesign giant platinum mine, 43% energy savings, 2–3-y paybacks
- ◇ Redesign new data center, save 89%, cut capex & time, improve uptime
- ◇ Redesign next new chip fab, eliminate chillers, save 2/3 el., 1/2 capex
- ◇ Redesign supermarket, save 70–90%, better sales, ?lower capex
- ◇ Redesign new chemical plant, save ~3/4 of auxiliary el., –10% capex
- ◇ Redesign cellulosic ethanol plant, –50% steam, –60% el, –30% capex
- ◇ Redesign new 58m yacht, save 96% potable H<sub>2</sub>O & 50% el., lower capex
- ◇ “Tunneling through the cost barrier” now observed in 29 sectors
- ◇ None of this would be possible if original designs had been good
- ◇ Needs engineering pedagogy/practice reforms; see [www.10xE.org](http://www.10xE.org)



# Electric shock: low-/no-carbon decentralized sources are eclipsing central stations

RMI analysis: [www.rmi.org/sitepages/pid171.php#E05-04](http://www.rmi.org/sitepages/pid171.php#E05-04)



- Two-thirds combined-heat-and-power (cogeneration)\*, ~60–70% gas-fired, ≥50% CO<sub>2</sub> reduction
  - \*Gas turbines ≤120 MWe, engines ≤30 MWe, steam turbines only in China
- One-third renewable (including hydropower only up to 10 MW<sub>e</sub>)
- In 2005, micropower added 4× as much output and 11× (excl peaking & standby units, 8×) as much capacity as nuclear power added
- *1/6 of el, 1/3 of new el, & rising*
- 1/6 to >1/2 of all electricity in 13 industrial nations
- Negawatts comparable or bigger; central plants have <1/2 of market!
- Micropower is winning due to lower costs & financial risks, so it's financed mainly by private capital (only central planners buy nuclear)









# Central power stations' fatal competitors

Levelized cost of *delivered* electricity or end-use efficiency (zero distributed benefits); remote sources incur 2.75¢/kWh (1996 embedded IOU average) delivery cost, including grid losses

Cost of saved or supplied electricity, 2004 US¢/kWh (Savings: 12-y av. life, 4%/y real discount rate; Supply: merchant cashflow model or market empirical; wind: 30-y life, 4%/y real; cogeneration: 25-y life, 4%/y real)

Keystone (6/07): 10.3 to 12.9¢



Median price of 5.7 GW commissioned in 1999–2006,  $\sigma = 0.12\%$ ; cheapest was  $>1.3\%$  lower

5 kWh of coal-fired generation's net carbon emissions displaceable per \$0.10 spent: 1.0 1.2–1.7 0.9–1.7+ 2.2–6.5+ 2.4–8.9+ >2–10+

Actual costs depend on many site- and plant-specific factors; all costs on this chart are indicative.

Natural gas: 1 "MCF" (thousand cubic feet) ~ 1.03 million BTU ~ 1.09 GJ all at levelized real prices

Remote ← → Onsite

Nuclear (MIT)  
+ at least new 2005 subsidies

Coal (MIT)  
+ \$100/tC carbon tax

Combined-cycle gas (MIT)  
\$4–7/MCF  
+ \$100/tC carbon tax

2003–04 wind, firmed (0.6¢/kWh) + integration (0.3¢)  
add back subsidy (but ignore the probably bigger nuclear subsidies)  
expected 2012 (some cost less now)

Combined-cycle industrial  
\$5–8/MCF gas

Building-scale

Recovered-heat industrial

Broader, esp. residential, and sub-optimal programs  
Good business retrofits

Optimized new installations (all sectors)

Central stations, 2004 subsidies, no reserve margin; the official studies count only these

Cogeneration (CHP)

End-use efficiency





## So it's not surprising that worldwide in 2006 ...

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- ◇ New nuclear capacity was smaller than solar PV additions, or  $1/10^{\text{th}}$  of windpower additions
- ◇ Nuclear retirements exceeded additions, so *net* nuclear capacity fell by 0.5 GW while micropower added >30 net GW
- ◇ Micropower passed nuclear power in total annual electricity production (16% of total)
- ◇ Distributed renewables got \$56b of private risk capital; nuclear, as always, got zero
- ◇ And in China, distributed renewables had 49 GW—7× nuclear capacity—and added 7× more per year



## All options face implementation risks; what does market behavior reveal?

- ◆ California's 1982–85 fair bidding with roughly equal subsidies elicited, vs. 37-GW 1984 load:
  - 23 GW of contracted electric savings acquisitions over the next decade (62% of 1984 peak load)
  - 13 GW of contracted new generating capacity (35% of 1984 load), most of it renewable
  - 8 GW (22%) of additional new generating capacity on firm offer
  - 9 GW of new generating offers arriving per year (25%)
  - Result: glut (143%) forced bidding suspension in April 1985
  - Lesson: real, full competition is more likely to give you too many attractive options than too few!
- ◆ Ultimate size of alternatives also dwarfs nuclear's
  - El. end-use efficiency:  $\sim 2\text{--}3\times$  (EPRI) or  $4\times$  nuclear's 19% US share at below its *short-run* marginal delivered cost
  - CHP: industrial alone is comparable to nuclear; + buildings CHP
  - On-/nearshore wind:  $>2\times$  US & China el.,  $\sim 6\times$  UK,  $\sim 35\times$  global\*
  - Other renewables: collectively even larger, PVs almost unlimited
  - Land-use and variability *not* significant issues

\*[www.stanford.edu/group/efmh/winds/global\\_winds.html](http://www.stanford.edu/group/efmh/winds/global_winds.html), on- and nearshore sites with annual mean windspeeds  $\geq 6.9$  m/s at 80m hub,  $\sim 72$  TW



## Negawatts can be fast, even with old implementation methods

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- ◇ In ~1975–85, most new U.S. end-use devices—cars, buildings, refrigerators, lighting systs., etc.—doubled in efficiency ( $\sim 7\%/y$ )
- ◇ In 1983–85, 10 million people served by Southern California Edison Company (then the #3 US investor-owned utility) were cutting its 10-years-ahead forecast peak load by  $8\frac{1}{2}\%$  *per year*, at a reported cost  $\sim 1\%$  that of adding supply
- ◇ In 1990, New England Electric System got 90% of a small-business retrofit pilot program's market ( $1.5\times$  target) in 2 months
- ◇ PG&E got 25% of its 1990 new-commercial-construction market in 3 months, raised its 1991 target, and got it all during 1–9 Jan.
- ◇ Even without helpful policy (in all but a few states), the U.S. has cut electric intensity  $> 2\%/y$  in 6 of the past 10 y (av.  $1.7\%/y$ )
- ◇ New delivery methods are even better—not just marketing negawatts but making markets *in* negawatts, thus maximizing competition in who saves and how—and marketing efficiency for its side-benefits, not only for cutting energy costs



# Nuclear power's market collapse is *good* for climate and security

Lovins *et al.*, *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1980; Lovins, *Scientific American*, Sept. 2005

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- ◇ Buy 2–10× more climate protection per \$ & per year
- ◇ Inhibits spread of nuclear bombs (Iran, N. Korea,...)
- ◇ Frees up money and attention for superior alternatives— $\sim 10^4\times$  macroeconomic leverage to fund other needs (development/health/education/public safety)
- ◇ How? Just let all ways to save or produce energy compete fairly—no matter which they are, where they are, what technology they use, how big they are, or who owns them
- ◇ More prosperity, stronger democracy, safer world





## Two 1989 climate-strategy cases that scope the world's conditions

- ◇ Sweden: Vattenfall, "The Challenge of Choices"
  - Cold, cloudy, far north, heavily industrialized, relatively efficient
  - Half of Swedish el. saveable at 78% lower cost than making more
  - Least-cost strategy (doubled el. end-use eff. + some fuel-switching + environmental dispatch) could achieve forecast 54% GDP growth 1987–2010, shut down nuclear half of el. supply, reduce heat-and-power-sector CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by 1/3, cut el. service cost \$1b/y
  - Report (in T B Johansson's *Electricity*) little-known, ignored, valid
- ◇ India: Amulya Reddy, roadmap for Karnataka state
  - A little efficiency & natural gas, bagasse CHP, biogas/producer gas, solar water heaters, small hydro—far from comprehensive mix
  - Would achieve far greater and faster economic development
  - Would have 3/5 lower el. demand, 2/3 lower cost, and 99.5% less fossil-fuel CO<sub>2</sub> than utility's official plan (*both* plans were rejected)
- ◇ Both: efficiency more than pays for renewables, making major carbon savings better than free
- ◇ Today's technologies/designs are far better & cheaper



## Five implementation myths

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- ◆ “It isn’t happening—why not?”
  - U.S. E/GDP (1975–2006) fell 48% for energy, 54% for gas, 64% for direct natural gas; total U.S. oil, coal, and energy use *fell* in 2006. Far more *could* happen if we paid attention
- ◆ “Solutions must await global agreement”
- ◆ “Pricing carbon is the essential first step”
  - Internalizing carbon costs will be valid and helpful, but not essential, sufficient, nor probably very important (because efficient carbon markets will clear at low or negative prices)
  - *Ability to respond* to price (“barrier-busting”) matters more
- ◆ “Public policy = taxes, subsidies, and mandates”
  - Other instruments, such as car feebates and utility decoupling-and-shared-savings, are more effective and attractive
- ◆ “Public policy is the only, or the strongest, key”
  - Innovative competitive strategy, technology, and design, all from *business* coevolving with civil society, are more dynamic



# The two biggest public-policy levers to support the business logic

1. *Reward electricity and gas distribution companies for reducing customers' bills, not for selling more electricity*
    - Decouple profits from sales volumes using a balancing account
    - Let distributor keep a small part of the savings it achieves for its customers
    - Unanimously endorsed by US state utility regulators 7/88, adopted in ~7–9 states, derailed by restructuring, now coming back: in place for electricity in CA and ID, for gas in ~8–10 states; many more on the way; NRDC and Energy Foundation lead these reforms, [www.raponline.org](http://www.raponline.org) supports Commissions
  2. *Use size- and revenue-neutral "feebates" to widen the price spread between less and more efficient light-duty vehicles (of a given size)*
    - Within a given size class, fees on inefficient and rebates on efficient models, so buyers will consider the full 14-year lifecycle savings, not just the first year or two
    - Encourages choice of efficient vehicles of the desired size, not of a different size
    - ~90% of feebates' effect comes from automakers' shifting their offerings to try to move from fee zone to rebate zone; this *increases* their (& dealers') profit margins
    - Reverse proposed EU policy: we must base efficiency standards on size not weight!
- ◇ These and other innovative policies are more effective, and far more politically attractive, than traditional ones (like stds. and fuel taxes)
- ◇ A ripe opportunity for *Länder*-level leadership and experimentation



# Implementation reality: Compete to win...via efficiency



- ◇ Boeing's crisis in 1997 was like Detroit's today
  - Wrenching changes instituted at BCA, including TPS (e.g., moving assembly); mfg. & costs brought back under control; but what next?
- ◇ In 2003, Airbus for the first time outproduced Boeing
  - "This is really a pivotal moment...could be the beginning of the end for Boeing's storied airplane business," said Richard L. Aboulafia, a Teal Group aerospace analyst, in 2003
- ◇ Boeing's bold, efficiency-led 2004 response: *787 Dreamliner*
  - $\geq 20\%$  more fuel-efficient than comparable modern aircraft, *same price*
  - 80% advanced composite by volume, 50% by mass →
    - Bigger windows, higher-pressure cabin
  - 3-day final assembly (737 takes 11 days)
  - 885 orders (857 firm + 28 pending) + 430 options & rights
  - Sold out into 2016—fastest order takeoff of any jetliner in history
  - Now rolling out 787's radical advances to *all* models (Yellowstone)
- ◇ Airbus: Ultra-jumbo A380, 2 years late, ~€5b over budget
  - Response? Efficient, composite A350—probably too late
- ◇ Boeing's breakthrough strategy flipped the sector in 3 years







***"Only puny secrets need protection.  
Big discoveries are protected  
by public incredulity."***

our move...

—Marshall McLuhan

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